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ABSTRACT

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) need to understand and handle various informal institutions in host countries
to survive and succeed. How MNEs effectively manage informal institutional characteristics of host countries
is an important question for both practitioners and scholars. This paper addresses this important but neglected
topic based on an in-depth longitudinal qualitative study. It identifies some key informal institutions in Australia,
examines how such institutional distinctiveness shapes the behaviour of Chinese expatriates and MNEs and
how they handle such informal institutional differences between China and Australia. Our findings challenge
some taken-for-granted assumptions regarding informal institutions in the literature and demonstrate that
informal institutions of host countries significantly shape the behaviour of expatriates and firm-level strategies
of MNEs.
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INTRODUCTION
According to institutionalism, organizations operate in the web of various intertwined institutions
spun by social actors (Scott,2013). It is a consensus view that institutions matter. Institutional networks
structure opportunities, generate social expectations and incentives, shape human behaviour and
interaction, and determine transaction costs (North, 1990). Failing to comprehend institutions
adequately and accurately could be costly for both individuals and organizations.
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) investing outside home countries as a ‘stranger in a strange land’
(Heilein,1961), need to comprehend and handle various formal and informal institutions so as to
survive and succeed. Therefore, how MNEs effectively respond to and strategically manage formal and
informal institutional characteristics of host countries is a central question for both practitioners and
scholars. For that reason, scholars have shown a growing interest in institutional environment and
how MNEs deal with the complex institutional context when operating overseas (e.g., Allen, Allen, &
Lange, 2018; Regnér & Edman, 2014).
Nevertheless, comprehending formal and informal institutions of host countries can be a
challenging task for MNEs. As North (1990, p.107) has noted, it might be less challenging to be precise
about formal written rules, but it is not easy to be precise about informal institutions since we cannot
see or touch such deep ‘constructs of the human mind.’ Given the tacit nature of informal institutions,
it is not easy to identify, interpret, and measure them adequately and precisely (Sartor & Beamish,2014;
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Wang, Lu, Soderlund, & Chen,2018).In recent decades, scholars have paid more attention to the
relationship between formal institutions (e.g., property rights, rule of law, and anti-trust regulation,
etc.)and MNEs, but the relationship between informal institutions and MNEs has not attracted enough
attention (Dau, Chacar, Lyles, & Li,2018; Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008; Regnér & Edman, 2014; Sartor
& Beamish, 2014; Seyoum, 2011). Although the existing MNE literature is full of studies on cultures,
culture and informal institution are not an identical construct (Dau et al., 2018; Helmke & Levitsky,
2004, 2006; Redding, 2008; Seyoum, 2011). Consequently, since informal institution becomes tangled
up with culture in the mainstream MNE literature, there are gaps in our understanding of the
relationship between informal institution and MNEs. We do not have enough knowledge regarding
the interactions between informal institutions and enterprise-level strategies of MNEs. How informal
institutions shape the behaviour of MNEs and how MNEs respond to informal institutional variations
in host countries have not been well understood (Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008; Regnér & Edman,
2014; Seyoum, 2011). However, informal institutions, as “rules in force” (Ostrom, 2005), structure social
expectations and significantly shape business activities and transaction costs (Sartor & Beamish, 2014).
Both formal and informal institutions should be comprehensively integrated into the mainstream
management studies (Wang et al., 2018).
The void in the literature informs this study to explore how MNEs learn to navigate the web of
informal institutions in host countries so as to advance our understanding of interactions between
informal institutions and MNEs. Differing from the mainstream MNE literature satisfied with examining
the relationship between cultures and MNEs, this study goes beyond national cultures into informal
institutions. It is also among limited MNE studies that empirically identify informal institutions of a host
country and examine coping strategies of expatriates and MNEs. This enables our research to
contribute to the literature in terms of both theoretical and practical implications.
Given that research on the internationalization of emerging economy multinational enterprises
(EMNEs) is still in its infancy, the post-entry internationalization process of EMNEs has not received
enough attention (Luo & Zhang, 2016), it remains unclear how EMNEs handle informal institutions in
host countries, especially in developed economies (Klossek, Linke, &Nippa,2012). Therefore, based on
an in-depth longitudinal qualitative study, this paper empirically examines the interaction of EMNEs
(Chinese MNEs) investing in a developed country (Australia) with local informal institutional
characteristics through exploring the following questions:
1.

What are the major Australian informal institutions that shape the relationship between MNEs
and local major stakeholders?
2. How do Chinese MNEs and their expatriates handle the informal institutional characteristics in
Australia?

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses the existing
understanding of informal institutions and the relationships between formal and informal constraints,
aiming to clarify the concept of informal institution. Section three elaborates on the existing studies
on the relationship between informal institutions and MNEs, aspiring to make clear the trends and
gaps in the literature. Section four discusses the methodological approach to data collection and
analysis. Sections five and six present our findings of major Australian informal institutions and how
Chinese MNEs manage the informal institutional environment. The paper is concluded by discussing
findings, contributions, implications, and limitations, together with future research directions.
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CLARIFYING INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
Institution is a widely used concept with different interpretations in the social sciences (Scott, 2013).
For North (1991, p.97), institutions are “rules of the game”; for Orr and Scott (2008, p.565), institutions
are “symbolic frameworks that provide guidelines for behaviour, and lend stability, regularity, and
meaning to social life”; whereas Huntington (1969, p.12) defines institutions as “stable, valued,
recurring patterns of behaviour”.
Institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social
interaction” involve both formal and informal rules (North, 1990, p.97; Wang et al., 2018). Usually,
formal institutions such as laws and regulations are consciously designed written rules enforced by
the state; while informal institutions such as customs and patterns of action are usually tacit, taken for
granted, and unconsciously followed (Zhang, 2016). Format (written or unwritten), design
(consciously designed or unconsciously formed), and enforcement mechanism (enforced officially or
non-officially) are major criteria used to draw a line between formal and informal institutions.
Therefore, Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p.727) define informal institutions as “socially shared rules,
usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned
channels”.
In the literature, the term informal institution has been applied to various non-codified and
nonofficial phenomena such as taboos, customs, traditions, codes of conduct, civil society, routines,
patterns of action, and national culture, among others (Levitsky & Helmke, 2006; North, 1991; Seyoum,
2011). Therefore, Helmke and Levitsky (2004; 2006) warn that writers should not treat informal
institution as “a residual category” used to describe any behavioural regularity. A behavioural
regularity can be viewed as an institution only if it is rooted in shared expectations of appropriate
behaviour and rule-bound, that is, not following the pattern will trigger some kind of social sanction
(Knight, 1992; Levitsky&Helmke,2006).
Helmke and Levitsky (2006, pp.13-18) identified four types of informal institutions based on the
relationship of formal and informal institutions: complementary, accommodating, competing, and
substitutive. Complementary informal institutions are those filling in gaps of formal institutions or
urging people to comply with formal rules. Accommodating informal institutions generate incentives
for actors to pursue alternative ways without directly violating the formal rules. Competing informal
institutions encourage actors to act in ways different from what is expected by the formal constraints;
whereas substitutive informal institutions emerge where formal rules are ineffective. Such a
classification is based on some hidden assumptions: 1) informal institutions are less important than
formal rules; 2) informal institutions only serve as a subsidiary which fills gaps of formal regulations or
modifies formal rules; 3) informal institutions emerge only when formal rules are ineffective; and, 4)
informal institutions function well only when the formal institutional environment is weak and
unsuccessful. However, these hidden assumptions remain controversial given the shortage of
empirical evidence. Our study hopes to testify whether such assumptions are tenable or not based on
qualitative findings.
Among the various debates on informal institutions, perhaps the most controversial issue is the
relationship between the concepts of informal institution and national culture. There are several
competing understandings regarding this relationship. Some scholars view national culture as a major
content of a country’s informal institutions (Pejovich, 1999); some view informal institution and
national culture are identical concepts (e.g., Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Filiou & Golesorkhi, 2016). By
contrast, some authors believe that these two terms are not synonymous but have a causal
relationship (Redding, 2008). For example, Helmke and Levitsky (2004; 2006) argue that informal
institutions are norms, whereas national cultures are shared values. Norms rooted in shared beliefs
might have a cultural source or have nothing to do with national cultures. National cultures can
__________________________________________________
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generate, reinforce, or undermine certain unofficial constraints (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). A country’s
national culture is only one of the sources of its informal institutions, political systems and laws are
also sources of informal rules. Therefore, countries with a similar national culture (e.g., North and
South Korea) may have different informal institutions, constituting noticeable country differences.
Redding (2008) draws a clear line between culture and institution. According to Redding (2008,
p.266), culture and institution belong to different realms. Culture is the world of ideas while
institutions are the world of order. In other words, culture as logics of action belongs to “the realm of
meaning and interpretation”, while institutions are “rules of the game in the field of social action”
(Redding, 2008, p.261). As “systems of meaning” which help people make sense of their surroundings,
culture is at a deep layer and does not directly determine human action. By contrast, as rules, norms,
and stable patterns of action, institutions are at the surface and shape human action (Redding, 2008,
p.266). For example, reciprocity as a belief is a Chinese business culture, while guanxi (connections) as
a behaviour pattern constitutes an informal institution. Reciprocity can be used to justify guanxi, but
it is not guanxi. Culture provides meaning for institutions but not institutions. Moreover, culture and
institutions can “be a close match or a serious mismatch” (Redding, 2008, p.267). Therefore,
understanding cultural differences cannot ensure expatriates of MNEs to adequately understand the
informal institutional differences between host and home countries. This might be one of the major
reasons why cross-cultural training tends to be less effective and expatriate failure rates remain
appallingly high. Understanding institutional differences, especially country differences of informal
institutions, is essential for MNEs to correctly interpret host country markets.

INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND MNES
As an integral component of the institutional environment, informal institutions of a host country
matter a lot for MNEs operating in that nation. Firstly, without a better understanding of the informal
institutions in a host country, an MNE cannot precisely comprehend and interpret its institutional
environment. For example, the Constitution of some countries in the world such as the Republic of
Philippines and Mexico is very similar to that of the United States (Maddex, 1996). However, given the
different informal institutions, the business environment of these countries is more different than we
have expected. Even countries such as Canada and the U.S. who share language, historical and legal
traditions also have profound differences in terms of informal institutions and business environments
(Petersen & Pedersen, 2002). Moreover, scholars believe that MNE subsidiaries without a better
understanding of host country institutions will encounter a higher degree of liabilities of foreignness,
i.e., additional costs incurred by foreign firms due to unfamiliarity and discrimination that local firms
never face (Mallon & Fainshmidt, 2017; Zaheer, 1995). Unfamiliarity places MNEs at an informational
disadvantage, makes them fail to follow local institutions or violate local expectations unintentionally
(Joardar & Wu, 2011). According to social identity theory, MNEs failing to follow local norms or meet
local expectations are more likely to be viewed as outsiders, and are more difficult to earn legitimacy
and social support in host countries. Therefore, having a better understanding of local informal
institutions is very important for MNEs to avoid embarrassing misunderstanding and missteps (Joardar
& Wu, 2011). However, the relationship between informal institutions and MNEs has not received
enough scholarly attention (Dau et al., 2018; Seyoum,2011).
An extensive literature review reveals that research on the relationship between informal
institutions and MNEs has been dominated by two efforts: examining the institutional profile effect
and the cultural/psychic/institutional distance effect on foreign direct investment (FDI) and MNE
strategies (Dow et al., 2016; Van Hoorn & Maseland, 2016). Studies focusing on institutional profile
effects tend to choose one or several variables to represent the informal institutional environment in
a host country. For example, when examining the international expansion of firms, Deng and
__________________________________________________
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colleagues (2009) identify Guanxi (a firm’s network of relationships in a host country) as a dominant
informal institution which is significantly associated with the level of FDI.
By contrast, studies focusing on cultural/psychic/institutional distance effects shift their attention
from institutional characteristics of host countries to the differences between home and host
countries. The early literature focuses on the role of cultural distance in international business (Estrin,
Baghdasaryan, & Meyer,2009). Cultural distance refers to the difference between two countries in
terms of cultural values. However, adopting cultural distance as the proxy of cross-country differences
has received many criticisms since this construct has both theoretical and methodological limitations
(Shenkar,2012). Some writers believe that relying on cultural distance to capture country differences
is overly simplistic (Beugelsdijk, Kostova, Kunst, Spadafora, & van Essen,2018). Shenkar (2012) argues
that the cultural distance construct has some hidden assumptions without the support of logic or
empirical evidence. One of the hidden assumptions of this construct is that the perceived cultural
distance from the home country to the host country is identical to the perceived cultural distance from
the host country to the home country of MNEs. However, there is no evidence that people in home
and host countries perceive the cultural differences in the same way (Shenkar,2012).
Given the limitations of using culture as the proxy for country differences, the Uppsala
internationalization school introduces the concept of psychic distance to capture perceived country
differences (Alastair, Coldwell, & Joosub,2018). Psychic distance refers to “the sum of factors
preventing or disturbing the flows of information between firms and markets” (Johanson &
Wiedersheim Paul, 1975, p.308).Such factors include language, culture, religion, education, industrial
development, political system, time zones, and the like (Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2013). However,
psychic distance has been criticized since it is difficult to measure and its usage is arbitrary in nature
(Alastair et al., 2018). Moreover, similar with the issue of cultural distance, psychic distance
perceptions between countries are also not symmetric (Håkanson, 2014).
Since the mid-1990s, scholars have explored to understand country differences based on the
concept of institutional distance that refers to “the extent of difference/similarity between the
regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions of two or more institutional environments” (Kostova,
1996, p.30). Studies on institutional distance and MNEs reveal that institutional distance between
countries matters (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Research findings demonstrate that the larger the
institutional distance between home and host countries, the more difficult for MNEs to obtain local
legitimacy and transfer home country practices, and the higher the adaptation cost for MNEs (Cezar
& Escobar, 2015). However, how institutional distance matters is still less clear and has not been well
understood (Fortwengel, 2017; Van Hoorn & Maseland, 2016).
Given that research on the relationship between institutions and MNEs has been dominated by
examining the effects of institutional distance on FDI and MNEs, correspondingly, this stream of
research has been dominated by variable-based large-N studies where institutions and institutional
differences are just examined as abstract “variables” (Fortwengel, 2017; Jackson & Deeg, 2008).Such
a research method might miss “a number of potentially important explanations of how and why
exactly the particular institutional distance between two countries matters” (Fortwengel, 2017,
p.798). In practice, MNEs are “shaped by the nature and interactions between particular home and
host country institutions” (Jackson & Deeg, 2008, p.541), not just by the institutional differences. The
variable-based method might miss important ways in which institutions shape MNEs and MNEs
respond to institutional environments. Therefore, more qualitative studies are necessary so as to
obtain a better understanding of the relationship between institutions and MNEs (Fortwengel, 2017),
especially the interactions between informal institutions and emerging economy MNEs.
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RESEARCH METHOD
The research questions of this study justify that a qualitative method is appropriate to address our
inquiries. Since case studies “represent a methodology that is ideally suited to creating managerially
relevant knowledge” (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008, p.1465), this research utilizes a longitudinal,
multiple case design to obtain a comprehensive understanding of interactions between informal
institutions and MNEs, specifically, the interactions between informal institutions in Australia and
EMNEs from China.
Australia is selected as the context of this empirical study for two reasons. First, Australia has been
one of the top direct investment destinations for Chinese MNEs in the recent decade. Since 2013, China
has overtaken the US and become the largest source of approved foreign investment (The FIRB
report, 2017). Second, Australia is different from China on many dimensions such as history, culture,
and the economic and political systems. Given these striking differences, it is more likely for Chinese
MNEs to encounter unfamiliar informal institutions. Hence, Australia constitutes an ideal context to
examine how Chinese MNEs interact with local informal institutions.
Following strategies proposed by Yin (2009) and Patton (2002), case firms were selected based on
several criteria. First, the case MNE should be information-rich so that authors “can learn a great deal
about matters of importance” (Patton,2002, p.169). Therefore, case firms should be a subsidiary, have
both Chinese expatriates and local employees, and have operated in Australia for at least one year so
that Chinese expatriates should have some sort of close contact with local governments, communities,
and employees, and hence have encountered some kinds of local informal norms, routines, and
patterns of action. Second, case firms should come from different industries including mining,
manufacturing, and energy industries so as to ensure a representative sample. According to
Eisenhardt (1989) and Thomas (2004), when a multiple case design is desirable, four to ten cases are
sufficient. Therefore, we chose eight case firms that were denoted by MNE1 to MNE8 to ensure
anonymity and the case profiles are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Profile of Case Chinese MNEs and Interviewees
Year of
Case
investment
MNEs
Industry
Ownership in Australia
Listed
MNE1 Mining
2006
company
MNE2 Energy
SOE
2008
Mineral
MNE3
SOE
2009
resource
MNE4 Mining
POE
2008
Listed
MNE5 Manufacturing
2007
company
Coal & coal
Listed
2004
MNE6
chemical
company
MNE7 Mining
SOE
2009
MNE8 Metallurgical
SOE
2008
Total

No. of
expatriates

Entry
mode

No. of
interviewees

68

Greenfield

7

12

Greenfield

4

15

M&A

3

10

Greenfield

2

75

JV

7

18

M&A

8

9
16

M&A
Greenfield

5
6
42

Notes: SOE: State-owned enterprise; POE: Private-owned enterprise; JV: Joint venture; and M&A: Mergers and
acquisitions.
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Since case studies are often criticized for the lack of methodological rigor (Thomas,2004), this study
followed the procedures suggested by Gibbert et al. (2008) to strengthen the validity and reliability of
our research. For example, to improve internal validity, multiple interviews were conducted with
Chinese expatriates who had worked in their Australian subsidiaries for at least one year. Key
informants were interviewed several times face to face or by phone to ensure consistency. Multiple
cases and multiple interviews enable us to examine a phenomenon from different perspectives. To
enhance construct validity, we exercised due diligence to obtain information from different data
sources. We collected data through semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and
documentation. Online resources including media news were also collected to triangulate our
empirical data. The external validity was boosted by our multiple case studies (Gibbert et al., 2008).
Procedures were also adopted to address the issue of reliability. We chose a longitudinal research
design; prepared a case study protocol to guide our field work; and ensured that at least two
researchers participated in interviews and focus group discussions (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Interviews and focus group discussions were conducted from 2012 to 2017. Within these years,
many fieldwork trips were arranged in major cities of Australia (such as Darwin, Perth, Sydney, and
Melbourne) for data collection. During the interviews and focus group discussions, we asked
participants to describe distinctive local norms, customs, and patterns of action they encountered in
Australia; the possible influence on their companies; and how Chinese MNEs handle such local norms
and patterned business practices. The interviews and focus group discussions usually ranged from 60
to 120 minutes. A total of 42 Chinese expatriates in the eight case MNEs were interviewed including
CEOs, general managers, board members, executive assistants, and heads of departments. The profile
of the interviewees is summarized in Table 1.
Data were analyzed utilizing methods proposed by Charmaz (2014). In order to dig out the different
layers of meaning in the data, notes of interviews and focus group discussions were coded by at least
two researchers following the three steps: initial coding, focused coding, and theoretical coding
(Charmaz, 2014). During initial coding, chunks of data were labelled by each researcher based on the
meaning identified from the data. After reaching an agreement among researchers about the initial
codes, we moved to focused coding to understand the relationships of initial codes and identify
dominant categories. During theoretical coding, we identified themes and concepts to capture
theoretical connections and ideas. During the coding process, we followed the constant comparative
method to understand similarities, differences, and patterns in the data (Charmaz, 2014). To enhance
construct validity, we compared our data with the literature to identify a coherent explanation. This
usually led to additional data collection and further analysis. Through memo-writing and comparing
the themes emerging from the data with the literature, this study identified some informal local
institutional characteristics, their effects on MNEs, and strategies of Chinese MNEs towards such
informal institutions. The findings and tentative arguments were checked by key informants to
enhance the validity and reliability of our research (Maxwell,1996). Table 2 offers examples of our data
coding process.
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Table 2. Examples of the Coding Process
Examples of interviewees’ words
•The government–enterprise
relationship is completely different
from that in China
•Governments have the
responsibility to help companies
•It is impossible for the Australian
government to bend their visa
policies for a foreign firm
•The relationship between
government and companies is
simple
•CSR adoption is generally voluntary
•Doing good to earn a good
reputation is not true kindness
•Not enough for an MNE to
contribute the same as local firms
•Chinese workers are ready to work
overtime
•Working beyond the normal
working hours is the exception, not
the norm
•Stop working immediately when it
is time for them to go home
•Local workers refuse working extra
minutes, let alone extra hours

Initial codes

Focused codes

Theoretical
codes

•Different government–
enterprise relationship
Government–
enterprise
relationship

•The universalistic
government-enterprise
relationship in Australia
•The particularistic
government-enterprise
relationship in China
•A new type of CSR
•The standards-based CSR

CSR

•The rights-based CSR

Work
Overtime

•Different attitudes
towards working
overtime & work-life
balance
• Companies as the family
of employees
•Different work norms

An informal
institution: the
universalistic
governmententerprise
relationship

An informal
institution: the
rights-based
CSR
An informal
institution: the
work-life
balance
preference and
the ‘zerominute
overtime’
norm

AUSTRALIAN INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS PERCEIVED BY CHINESE MNES
MNEs may encounter various socially endorsed norms of behaviour in host countries. To make our
research manageable, this paper only focused on some major local informal institutional
characteristics that shape the relationship between Chinese MNEs and key Australian stakeholders
such as government, local communities, and employees. Apart from formal rules such as labour
regulations and environment laws, the tacit socially shared norms also shape the expectations and
behaviour of MNEs and their local stakeholders. The following are some distinctive informal
institutions identified by this research.
THE UNIVERSALISTIC GOVERNMENT-ENTERPRISE RELATIONSHIP
A universalistic government-enterprise relationship refers to a rule-based and impersonal relationship
where regulations, in any situations, are applied to all firms without much flexibility. It is the opposite
of a particularistic government-enterprise relationship which can be found in China where policy
implementation might be shaped by specific situations and relationships. Since such a universalistic
government-enterprise relationship is prevalent and widely accepted as appropriate and desirable in
__________________________________________________
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Australia, it can be considered as institutional. Government officials failing to follow such a
universalistic principle may invite public criticism. Such a government-enterprise relationship has its
cultural sources since China has a particularistic national culture whereas Australia has a universalistic
national culture (Stone & Stone-Romero, 2008). Such a norm also has its roots in official regulations
and laws and thus it is easily mistaken for a formal institution. The difference in terms of the
government-enterprise relationship is one of major institutional distinctions between China and
Australia. The executive chairman of MNE1 described how such a universalistic norm of governmententerprise relationship looked like and influenced the implementation of government policies,
According to the official regulations and laws of China and Australia, government and
enterprises should have an impersonal relationship in both countries. However, I find the
government-enterprise relationship in Australia is completely different [from that in China]. In
China, government has the responsibility to help companies within their jurisdiction. If a
company encounters serious difficulties, it is natural for them to turn to government for help.
Local governments are also happy to help them so as to boost the local economy. But in
Australia, government agencies only formulate and follow rules. It is impossible for them to
make an exception to rules in order to resolve issues of specific companies […] Our project has
suffered from serious delays and overspends in recent years. So we appeal to the Australian
government, hoping it allows us to bring more Chinese skilled workers to speed up construction
and reduce costs. However, they refuse to do so.
This sentiment was echoed by the deputy manager of MNE7,
One of our projects is located around five hundred miles from here [a large Australian city]. The
village life of our expatriates working there is too harsh. So the parent company decides to send
several Chinese chefs there to improve the quality of life. However, the chefs cannot get a visa
since the Australian government insists that these chefs should take an IELTS test. Is a good
command of English necessary for such a position? Is it possible that a Chinese chef with English
skills is willing to work in that remote area? However, it is impossible for the Australian
government to bend their policies for a firm. In China, the response of the government will be
different… The government will help us following the norm which fixing special issues with
special methods.
THE RIGHTS-BASED CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
According to McWilliams and Siegel (2000, p.117), CSR refers to “voluntary corporate practices aimed
at furthering social goods, beyond the interest of the firm and that which is required by law”. Rathert
(2016, p.860) groups CSR into two distinct categories: standards-based CSR which firms used to meet
the minimum legal requirements, and rights-based CSR which firms used to address expectations of
stakeholders and defines the rights-based CSR as “a set of discretionary social practices addressing
stakeholder expectations related to the organizational implementation of legal rules and social
norms”. Although various definitions of CSR emphasize its voluntary nature as “a form of private
governance” (Rathert, 2016, p.860), CSR nowadays has actually, in many developed economies
including Australia, evolved into a strong informal institution that shape social expectations of
stakeholders regarding companies, especially MNEs. MNEs nowadays are facing more pressure to
engage in CSR initiatives in host countries, particularly in countries with a strong institutional
environment which authorizes stakeholders to ‘demand’ CSR behaviour from companies.
Consequently, MNEs are required to undertake more CSR activities to meet the expectations of local
__________________________________________________
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stakeholders so as to obtain legitimacy. Many MNEs utilize CSR adoption as a signaling strategy to
demonstrate their commitment to local stakeholders and reduce the liability of foreignness (Campbell,
2007; Rathert, 2016). When discussing the CSR adoption of Chinese MNEs, one manager of MNE4
explained,
In China, CSR adoption is generally voluntary for companies without a high-profile name. But in
Australia, everyone in the local community knows that you are a foreign company and wants us
to contribute more. In order to build a good relationship [with the local community], foreign
companies usually conduct more CSR activities than local firms […] It is not enough for a foreign
company contributes just the same as a local company if it wants to earn enough local support.
The deputy manager of MNE5 offered a similar comment,
In China, usually companies deal only with local governments, not the local community. But in
Australia, a foreign company must make the local community happy, not the government. In
order to earn local support, our company has invested a lot in the regional health, education,
and youth programs […] Local people have a high expectation [of foreign firms]. Some people
often say that Chinese companies have money and should help us do this and do that. However,
we are a commercial company and must survive economically […] what is the scope of the social
responsibility for foreign firms?
THE NORM OF ZERO-MINUTE OVERTIME
Shaped by the collectivist culture and the paternalist tradition, managers in China hope employees to
treat the company as their family and go all out for their work. Working overtime tends to be viewed
as an indicator of organizational commitment and is quite common in the Chinese workplace. Apart
from employing overtime work as a strategy of impression management, Chinese employees usually
cannot refuse to work overtime if managers ask them to do so, although the government regulations
in China also have strict limits on overtime. If they are paid for overtime work, many Chinese employees
are happy to work overtime.
By contrast, in Australia, working overtime is less common. This is not the result of the Australian
formal institutions since labor regulations in both countries set strict limits on overtime. It is mainly
the work-life balance preference shared by most Australian organizations and workers. This does not
mean that Australian people never work extra time, but working beyond the normal working hours is
the exception, not the norm. Chinese expatriates tend to be very impressed by this work norm. One
board officer of MNE1 told the researchers,
When our company prepared the feasibility report of this Australian project, the team ignored
the local work norms and assumed that Australian employees are flexible as Chinese workers in
terms of working hours and are ready to work overtime. However, we soon find that local
workers refuse to work extra minutes, let alone extra hours, even if the project has been serious
delayed and we promise to pay them at a higher rate.
The Office manager in MNE3 felt the same way,
The working hours of our company are from 9am to 5pm. If you visit an office of local employees
at, say, 5:05pm, you usually cannot find anyone […] You can only find Chinese expatriates in the
company after business hours […] I heard a story that local workers are making some pre-made
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parts using cement and sand. They stop working immediately when it is time for them to go
home, leaving some pre-made cement parts unfinished and hence ruined. Although it is
estimated that they can finish the job if they work overtime for just five to twenty minutes, they
refuse to do so. […] I also read a news report that a local employee sued her boss for 500
thousand dollars because the boss made her work overtime for one to six minutes for around
twenty times during her six-month job. It is unbelievable in China.
Such a norm of ‘zero-minute overtime’ in the Australian workplace cannot be explained just by
labor regulations. It is a workplace routine that local employees strictly protect the boundary of work
and life.
SAFETY AND HEALTH FIRST IN THE WORKPLACE, NOT EFFICIENCY
All Chinese expatriates interviewed were impressed by how work is carried out in a safe manner in the
Australian workplace. In most cases, Australian employees try their best to carry out responsibilities in
a safe and secure way, although efficiency could be sacrificed. Giving workplace safety and health the
highest priority has become a workplace convention in Australia. On the surface, this is because
Australia has comprehensive work health and safety (WHS) laws. However, many countries have
similar regulations but have not achieved a similar level of workplace safety. As one manager of MNE6
commented,
It is difficult to say that safety regulations in China are not comprehensive and strict. Many
Chinese companies also attach great importance to workplace safety but many of them have
failed to minimize unsafe workplace behaviour. Safety managers in China often wonder why
unsafe behaviour cannot be eliminated in their companies.
The Managing Director of MNE2 was impressed by this Australian work norm,
The Australian culture seems incredibly relaxed and Australian people are seemingly very laid
back[…] However, in the workplace, they are meticulous workers and extraordinarily
professional, prefer quality [over quantity], and strictly follow various regulations […] A project
which can be done within one year in China might take three years in Australia, but the quality
is good and the accident rate is extremely low.
One manager of MNE5 explained his judgment,
I have been thinking about this for a long time. The good WHS in Australia is not just the result
of laws and regulations enforced by government. The major reason is that the whole society,
not just government, has taken workplace health and safety seriously […] Apart from WHS laws,
every industry has codes of conduct to promote best practices and guide employees how to
work safely. Every organization also has health and well-being programs of their own to ensure
the health and safety of employees. These codes of conduct and organizational programs are
not legally enforceable, but people follow them strictly […] The WHS laws are not just laws;
they have developed into routines and habits of Australian organizations and employees.
The four informal institutions identified in this study have their cultural or legal roots. They are
derived from and shaped by national culture or regulations. Therefore, they are easily viewed as
cultural or legal characteristics. However, according to Redding (2008), culture belongs to “the world
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of ideas” which helps people make sense of their surroundings but does not determine behaviour,
while institutions belong to “the world of order” and directly determine human action. These
identified characteristics have definitely gone beyond “the realm of ideas” and turned into shared
ways of behaving and accepted “rules of the game” in Australia. In this study, universalism as a belief
constitutes a cultural dimension. It generates and justifies the impersonal and universalistic
government-enterprise relationship which as a behaviour pattern constitutes an informal institution.
Similarly, work-life balance as an idea generates and justifies the zero-minute overtime norm; while
the no-overtime norm as a behaviour pattern constitutes an informal institution which directly
determines workplace behaviour. The safety and health first in the workplace and the rights-based
CSR are not just values and beliefs but have become accepted pattered behaviour. It is necessary to
single out such informal institutions; otherwise they might be ignored or marginalised in studies on
national cultures and the cross-cultural training programs of MNEs.

STRATEGIES OF CHINESE EXPATRIATES AND MNES TOWARDS LOCAL INFORMAL
INSTITUTIONS
The four informal institutions identified in this study lay the foundation for our analysis of the coping
strategies of Chinese MNEs and their expatriates. How to deal with informal institutional differences
between home and host countries to avoid misunderstanding and missteps is a challenge for Chinese
expatriates and MNEs without rich international experience. In the fieldwork, we found that local
institutional characteristics had significantly shaped the behaviour of Chinese expatriates and
strategies of Chinese MNEs. Confronting local norms and customs that influence the expectations and
behaviour of stakeholders, Chinese expatriates and MNEs had gradually become less confused and
developed some strategies to address such institutional differences.
FROM COMPLAINING TO RESPECTING DIFFERENCES
Our longitudinal study had identified a clear change of the attitude of Chinese expatriates towards
local norms. In the early interviews, it was more likely to hear complaints from Chinese managers,
especially those newcomers. Later interviews indicated that most informants had changed their
attitude and developed positive views about different local work norms. As the executive chairman of
MNE1 explained,
In the beginning, there are some complaints that the Australian government is indifferent
towards foreign firms and refuses to help us out. Now we understand that such a governmententerprise relationship is just different from ours and not entirely bad. [In China], a good
relationship with government agencies is very important for companies. If a company is
important and has a good relationship with a government agency, sometimes a government
agency might make an exception for the company. Therefore, companies in China have invested
a lot of time and energy to build relationships with government officials […] But in Australia,
things are simple. You know government agencies will never change rules to help your
company. There is no need for companies to invest much time and energy to build relationships
with government. This sometimes makes our life easier.
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An assistant manager of MNE3 also expressed her understanding of the norm of zero-minute
overtime and did not agree to link working overtime with the level of organizational commitment,
I view it just as a different work norm. Chinese companies usually hope employees to treat the
company as their family and invest all their time into work, including their spare time when
needed […] People here pursue work-life balance and quality of life […] This just reflects the
difference in terms of how central work is [in people’s life]. It is difficult to say which one is
better.
Our fieldwork found that most Chinese expatriates had gradually gotten used to the country
differences and handle the differences in a positive way. One method adopted by Chinese expatriates
was to communicate honestly since they believed that communication is king. Several expatriates
interviewed told the researchers that they handle country differences very well through open and
honest communication, as the manager of MNE3 commented,
Nowadays you can find institutional differences anywhere; even within one large country. […] I
do not consider such differences are challenging and difficult to deal with. For me, if I do not
know or understand something, I just tell local colleagues that I do not know this as I am a
foreigner and ask them to give me suggestions.
FROM SUSPICION TO LEARNING WITH AN OPEN MIND
In the early discussions with informants, we found that some Chinese expatriate managers did not
fully agree with certain local work norms. They doubted whether such work norms were sustainable
since they seemed to be detrimental to efficiency. In the interviews of the following years, we found
that the doubt had largely disappeared and, in some cases, Chinese MNEs wanted to implant the same
work norms in their parent companies. As one mine manager of MNE6 explained,
We have talked about many country differences between China and Australia [...] To speak
frankly, in the beginning, we do not like the no-overtime norm and some work procedures
followed by local employees. They seem to be too rigid and lack efficiency. But now our patent
company is learning these workplace norms, they also want to turn the safety regulations into
routines of all employees to minimize the unsafe individual behaviour in the workplace.
Our fieldwork found that all case firms had attached importance to learning. Headquarters often
sent staff to their Australian subsidiaries for training and accumulating international experience;
subsidiaries also arranged local staff to work or attend training programs at headquarters. As a board
officer of MNE6 had commented,
From the perspective of efficiency, rigid regulations might be not desirable. But sometimes
hypercorrection is necessary […] It is good practice not to cut corners and bend safety
procedures for efficiency. We like these workplace norms now and promote them in China […]
The best practices of WHS management in this subsidiary have significantly improved the safety
management of our parent company in China.
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FROM GOVERNMENT-ORIENTATION TO COMMUNITY-ORIENTATION
Research findings revealed that case MNEs also tried to adapt their behaviour and business strategies
to the local institutional environment. Chinese expatriates interviewed told the researchers that their
companies did not invest much time and energy to build a close relationship with government agencies
in Australia when they understood the nature of government-enterprise relationship. Instead, they
had paid more attention to building a good relationship with local communities. The manager of MNE4
told the researchers:
In China, all companies want to build a good relationship with local government agencies. When
they meet difficulties, they tend to turn to government first. But in Australia, a good relationship
with government does not mean a good relationship with local communities, whereas making
local communities happy is more important. Therefore, our company has paid more attention
to the relationship with local communities.
The manager of MNE2 echoed the same idea,
In Australia, social license is most important. Our company has made every effort to obtain full
social support. A good relationship with local communities is earned by your local contributions,
the local government cannot help you get this.
FROM SILENT CSR TO OPEN CSR
According to the Chinese culture, people should engage in charitable activities anonymously, that is,
doing good deeds without leaving one’s name. Otherwise, you are viewed as self-interested since your
charitable behavior might be only for your own good and doing good to earn a good reputation is not
true kindness. Influenced by such a notion, case Chinese MNEs tended to engage in CSR activities
silently and ignored to publicize their CSR achievements. In the interviews of recent years, we found
that Chinese MNEs had emphasized the importance of letting others know their CSR performance and
openly disseminated their CSR programs. One manager in MNE6told the researchers:
In the beginning, we do not realize that we should publicize our CSR programs for corporate
reputation. We think if we do so, it is not a true CSR effort since you are actually investing in
your corporate reputation […] However, when local people demand that foreign companies
must contribute to the local community, you have to let everyone know what your company has
contributed so as to obtain social support. […] So, we learn from other companies and release
a sustainability report every year to make public all our CSR activities.
The CFO of MNE8 also told the researchers,
It is not good practice for Chinese MNEs not to publicize their CSR contributions for good
reputation. Chinese firms have not been well understood in Western countries. We should let
people know that Chinese firms are also responsible investors and are contributing to local
communities […] Therefore, our company publicize any CSR programs through our website and
media.
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FROM THE CHINESE WAY TO THE BEST-FIT STRATEGY
Interview findings revealed that case Chinese MNEs were confident about their business models since
the models were proved successful in the Chinese market. Therefore, some case MNEs such as MNE1,
MNE2, and MNE6 had initially tried to transfer their business models to their Australian subsidiaries
and run these firms in the Chinese way. They soon found that this was not good practice given the
huge difference between the Chinese and Australian workplaces. Therefore, these companies started
to adopt business models that best fit the local environment and manage subsidiary locally. One board
officer of MNE1 described the process to the researchers,
Our firm has bought several companies through acquisition in Australia. In the beginning, the
parent company sent many managers from China to cover key positions and attempted to run
the subunits in the Chinese way […] However, using too many expatriates has led to inefficiency
[…] Therefore, the head office has changed the policy, localized key positions and run them in
the same way as other Australian companies.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study seeks to explore host-country informal institutions that shape the behaviour and strategies
of expatriates and MNEs. Four local informal institutions were discussed, including the universalistic
and impersonal government-enterprise relationship, the rights-based CSR, the zero-minute overtime
norm, and giving health and safety the highest priority in the workplace. These norms are prevalent
and widely accepted as appropriate and desirable patterns of action in Australia, and hence can be
viewed as institutional. Although these norms shape the expectations of local stakeholders and the
relationship of MNEs with government, local communities, and employees, they are tacit and taken
for granted. MNEs failing to follow these conventions may invite public criticism or social sanction.
This study also examines the potential influences of informal institutions on the behaviour of MNEs,
and how Chinese expatriates and MNEs deal with the informal institutional differences between China
and Australia.
Our findings demonstrate that informal institutions of host countries, if not more significant, are as
important as the host-country formal institutions and national cultures for MNEs. Informal institutions
structure social expectations and attitudes, shape behaviour and management styles, and influence
interactions and relationships. Without a correct understanding of informal institutions, an MNE could
not comprehend the local institutional environment accurately. A better understanding of informal
institutions in host countries can help MNEs make the right decision and avoid embarrassing
misunderstanding and missteps.
This research makes several theoretical contributions to the literature. First, it is among the limited
studies analyzing Australian informal institutions and examining the interaction between MNEs and
informal institutional characteristics based on first-hand qualitative evidence.
Second, this research enriches our understanding of the relationship between formal and informal
institutions. Helmke and Levitsky (2006, pp.13-18) identified four types of relationship between formal
and informal institutions: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive. As discussed
earlier, such an understanding is based on some hidden assumptions: informal institutions are less
important than formal rules; they only serve as a subsidiary that fills gaps of formal regulations or
modifies formal rules; informal institutions emerge only when formal rules are ineffective; and
informal institutions function well only when the formal institutional environment is weak and
unsuccessful. However, our study demonstrates that informal institutions can emerge in a strong
institutional environment. For example, all the four informal institutions identified in this study emerge
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as results of a strong regulative environment. Without the support of formal regulations, no one
knows whether these informal norms can emerge and function well or not. Conventional wisdom
tends to assume informal institutions complement and enhance formal institutions, not vice versa.
This research reveals a new relationship between formal and informal institutions, that is, strong
formal institutions foster the emergence of similar and related informal institutions. Moreover, our
study demonstrates that the emergence of informal institutions may encourage people to comply with
similar and related formal institutions. For instance, without the norm of prioritizing workplace health
and safety, the Australian Work Health and Safety Act might have not been strictly followed by local
employees. Therefore, formal institutions should be sublimated into informal norms to ensure a high
level of compliance. Sublimation here refers to the process of internalizing legal requirements into
taken-for-granted patterns of action through socialization.
Third, this study empirically identified and examined some informal institutions, which advances
our understanding about informal institutions and the relationship between informal institution and
national culture. Our analysis reveals that informal institution and culture are not synonymous. Culture
generates and justifies informal institutions. Culture is one source, but not the only source, of informal
institutions.
This study has implications for government, MNEs, cross-cultural educators, and MNE scholars. For
government, the relationships between formal and informal institutions can help government
improve the enforcement of formal rules. Given that formal rules cannot function well without the
support of informal institutions, and informal norms can emerge from a strong regulative
environment, government can improve the effectiveness of formal rules through influencing or
cultivating informal norms. For example, in order to help companies manage workplace health and
safety effectively, the Safe Work Australia, a government agency, formulates various Model Codes of
Practice to guide people to handle WHS issues. These codes of practice are not legally enforceable but
have fostered the Australian society to form some WHS routines beyond the requirements of WHS
laws.
For MNEs and cross-cultural educators, our research demonstrates that informal institution and
culture are not the same, and informal institutional characteristics of host countries shape the social
expectations and behaviour of local stakeholders. Therefore, MNEs and cross-cultural educators
should pay enough attention to such informal constraints, not just focus on the national culture and
formal institutions of the host country. In addition, our research also helps new investors understand
some major Australian informal institutional characteristics and generate strategies to address the
complex local institutional environment.
For MNE scholars, our study demonstrates that qualitative research can provide rich information
regarding how informal institutions and MNEs interact in a host country. Exploring interactions of
informal institutional characteristics and MNEs based on qualitative data can enrich and deepen our
understanding of the institutional environment and the behaviour of MNEs. A longitudinal research
design will enable researchers to capture the pattern and attitude changes.
The major limitation of this study is that it is mainly based on perceptions of Chinese expatriates.
To enrich and triangulate data, local managers, employees, government agencies and local
communities should also be interviewed. Future research can improve the research design and
conduct interviews more comprehensively. Interactions between MNEs and local institutional
characteristics are a rich source for scholars. Future studies can identify more informal institutions and
more firm-level strategies of MNEs addressing country institutional differences.
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